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AN ANALYSIS OF FISCAL YEARS 2014 TO 2016 NAVY FOURTH 
QUARTER SPENDING: TRENDS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF Q4 






Former United States Under Secretary of Defense Robert Hale stated in a 
September 2016 article for Breaking Defense, “We need to find practical ways to apply 
the brakes to year-end spending so that [the Department of Defense] funds only its 
highest-priority needs.” This paper analyzes trends and characteristics of the Quarter 4 
(Q4) Navy spending habits driving the government’s decisions and the related impacts of 
those decisions. Previous trends have shown that under-execution in the government 
leads to future funding decrements. Although seldom documented, this practice leads to 
increased late spending and a potential for executing ahead of need, but results in an 
obligation of funds. Our research identifies trends across contractual spending in the 
Navy Operations and Maintenance accounts between fiscal years 2014 and 2016 to help 
ensure the government is getting the best value for the limited resources available. 
Analysis indicated that actual Q4 spending appears higher than historical rates, in excess 
of 35% in all years. We also noted trends in Q4 spending leading to an increased level of 
Indefinite Delivery Contracts, and a significant increase in overall contract actions 
processed. Surprisingly, even with the rush to obligate, 2014 data showed Q4 obligations 
trended higher than average utilizing Full and Open Competition.  
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Execution of government resources is one of the single most regulated and 
watched activities in both the government and private sector. Why? It is simple; 
execution of government funding impacts everyone. As tax payers, we want to know 
what the government is buying with our money; as service members, we want to ensure 
the government is buying the best for warfare and protection; as Congress, we want to 
ensure the government is executing to our best interests (whatever they may be at the 
time); and the list goes on and on. The heavy scrutinizing of resources is just one of the 
drivers pushing the governmental departments to focus on obligation factors rather than 
efficient processing. As we get closer to year-end, the rush for obligations and contractual 
awards to expend current-year funding skyrockets across the departments and brings to 
question: Are we really getting the best value for our critical resources?  
This research analyzes the execution and trends of the Department of the Navy’s 
(DON) contractual fourth quarter spending habits. The focus is on the Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) appropriations in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014–2016. Defined trends and 
identifiers can allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to identify efficiencies while 
protecting critical assets and continuing to meet the warfighters’ need. 
As the former DOD Comptroller Robert Hale stated in a September 2016 article 
from Breaking Defense, “Year-end spending pays for lower-quality and lower-priority 
projects. We need to find practical ways to apply the brakes to year-end spending so that 
DOD funds only its highest-priority needs” (Hale, 2016, para. 2). In 1979 and 1980, the 
Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management also noticed this spike 
in departmental fourth-quarter spending and issued a report titled “‘Hurry-Up’ 
Spending.” In general, this report comments on the rush for departmental spending in the 
fourth quarter and any impacts or causes such as lack of competition, poorly defined 
statements of work, inadequately negotiated contracts, and procurement of lower priority 
items (“Hurry-Up” Spending, 1980). The rush for execution is exacerbated within the 
O&M appropriation as an operating account with only a single year of funding 
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availability. Congressional processes where put into place as a result of this report; 
however, concerns with Q4 O&M spending remain.  
The DON has an extensive O&M budget, executing over $40 billion each FY. 
The DON published its Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2016 Budget 
(Secretary of the Navy [SECNAV], 2015) with the appropriation levels shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  Department of the Navy O&M Appropriation Summary. 
Adapted from SECNAV (2015).   
Congress enacted a statutory limit on DOD spending related to one-year 
appropriations called the 80/20 rule to assist with fourth-quarter spending concerns 
(Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2011, p. 4-25). The DOD must now certify 
that no more the 20% of the current fiscal year appropriations are obligated during the 
last two months of the fiscal year (i.e., the 80/20 rule). But as we have seen, this rule still 
leaves room for final spikes in an effort to avoid loss of critical current-year and future-
year funds. 
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This research further analyzes these spikes and financial trends on the DON’s 
spending habits as we near fiscal year end, and compares them to data sets on execution 
throughout the year. Our intent is to consider root causes and common characteristics 
from the trends and analysis to pinpoint any lessons-learned and efficiencies for 
government end-of-year funds processing. Efficient processing is critical for our 
government’s funding as we move more and more into a declining resource-driven 
environment. As technology expands into the software environment, costs continue to 
rise, and resources continue to decline, it quickly becomes apparent that, if we are to 
remain agile and fund our highest priorities, the government needs to gain better and 
efficient processing of its resources. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
Government spending often seems to be the most criticized and monitored 
activity in the DOD, particularly in the O&M appropriations. Leaders are expected to 
spend quickly and efficiently, while still meeting stake holder requirements and not 
wasting government resources. The objective of this research is to identify trends and 
characteristics of DON’s spending habits late in the fiscal year, outline potential root 
causes for late awards, ensure the government is getting the best value for the dollars 
spent, and recommend potential avenues for better spending practices.  
Management of resources is predominately driven by policy and regulations, both 
at Congressional and Departmental levels. Our research expands upon the statutory and 
regulatory stipulations further in Chapter II. O&M appropriations are confined to a 12-
month period of availability for obligation. This represents the shortest availability of any 
appropriation for obligations, within government spending. The DOD 7000.14-R 
(Financial Management Regulation) Volume 2A, defines obligation as a “binding 
agreement that will result in outlays immediately or in the future” (Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller), 2008, p. 1-14). With that, O&M is also the most heavily 
scrutinized appropriation and plays a big role as a driver in the rush to spend dollars 
before expiration. 
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B. PURPOSE AND BENEFIT OF RESEARCH 
Why is it so critical for managers to ensure 100% spending by the end of the 
fiscal year? What drives these spending habits, and in turn what are the impacts to the 
Government, DOD, and tax payers for these rushed decisions? Understanding spending 
habits and characteristics of government actions can help bring light to these looming 
questions. The more the government understands spending habits and the impacts of 
those drivers, the better we can position the government to reduce wasteful spending and 
protect resources for needed capabilities.  
Many reports indicate that delayed spending can lead to rushed or faulty awards, 
reductions in competitive contracting, increased overtime necessary to perform additional 
workload in the last quarter, lower priority requirements being procured just to expend 
available funding, and increased potential for committing an Anti-deficiency Act 
violation. The research explores the possible impacts of allowing the military services 
more flexibility in the use of the O&M appropriation, extended use of availability, or 
relaxation of O&M expense/investment thresholds, and how they could result in the 
flexibility to better fund needed and short-funded assets in support of the warfighter. The 
constraints of our research do not allow for detailed analysis of the extent to which assets 
were short-funded through inefficiencies introduced in fourth quarter spending. However, 
the results of this research do shed light on year-end spending drivers, and how the 
additional flexibility for O&M could logically ameliorate those factors and benefit the 
government’s spending.  
Once drivers and impacts are well defined, the desire is for stakeholders to initiate 
change in policy for contractual spending within the O&M appropriation and incentivize 
better decision making for contract awards in the Q4. The potential benefits of this 
analysis are exponential, reaching not only the DON but also the DOD, Congress, and the 
everyday taxpayer. 
The DON would benefit from this analysis by furthering its understanding of the 
trends and habits of its contractual spending. Once the problem and driving factors are 
identified, the Department could initiate internal policy to better manage the spending of 
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its resources throughout the year and implement incentive factors to help relieve the 
stress of Q4 spending. With an increased understanding of the Navy’s spending habits, 
the Department can obtain an increased level of visibility into its requirements and 
resources needs to make more informed decisions on top priorities.  
Jason Fichtner and Robert Greene (2014) published a working paper titled 
“Curbing the Surge in Year-End Federal Government Spending: Reforming ‘Use it or 
Lose it’ Rules.” Within this paper, the authors explain the phenomenon known as “Use it 
or Lose it” in which the government is pressured to spend every dollar before year-end in 
avoidance of funds being “returned to the Treasury” and in turn, being penalized by a 
reduction in Congressionally Appropriated funds in the next fiscal year. Although this 
“policy” is not found in statute or regulation, it is a known practice within the 
government and a key driver for year-end execution (Fichtner & Greene, 2014, pp. 1-6). 
Services’ ability to understand habits and trends pushing these awards and gaining a 
chance to make changes in avoidance of losing valuable Total Obligational Authority 
(TOA) is a key benefit for the Navy.  
Congress would also be a large benefactor of this analysis. Every year, the 
President and Congress review the budget to determine the best value of their resources 
in support of the soldier’s needs. With the decline of discretionary spending, the 
efficiency of every dollar spent is critical. We must become smarter in how we resource 
our defenses efforts. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports have noted across 
the years the concern on DOD spending in the Q4. With a greater level of understanding 
on the driving factors influencing these spending habits, Congress could help by updating 
policy on the appropriations restrictions and incentivizing services to execute more 
effectively.  
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Analysis focuses on the Department of Navy’s O&M spending habits. The frame 
of reference for this research is Fiscal Years 2014–2016. Data sets are analyzed for 
spending across the entire fiscal year, Q1–Q4, with the majority of the analysis focused 
around fourth quarter spending. The analysis of quarters 1–3 is presented for comparison 
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and understanding of the depth of spending shown by the Department in Q4. Other 
services may be referenced as well as the holistic Department of the Defense for 
comparative analysis and determination of overall driving factors influencing spending 
habits.  
While overall spending may be referenced, this research focuses on the trends of 
contractual spending within the Navy. This includes contractual awards as well as 
modifications involving obligation of funds. We analyze specific factors of contractual 
spending as it relates to Q4 awards such as contract types (indefinite delivery versus 
definite contracts), competitive versus sole source awards, as well as utilization of small 
business. The intent is to identify if there is indeed a rush of Q4 spending, how significant 
that spending is, and examine some drivers and impacts to contractual awards. 
Regulations and citations are presented from publicly available sources to include 
the Financial Management Regulation (DOD 7000.14-R), the DOD 5000, and the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). High-level budget figures will be presented from 
publicized budgets from the White House.gov. Contract data were provided by the 
Department of the Navy (DON) to the authors of this research. The DON utilized the 
Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) to extract relevant data elements for our 
research. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary question driving our analysis and research is:  
• What are the trends and characteristics of DON spending throughout a 
fiscal year and how do they compare to spending in Q4?  
Secondary questions of our research: 
• What drives the Department to make these decisions as they relate to 
contractual spending in the rush of year-end awards with expiring dollars?  
• What are some ways the government can control spending habits and 
ensure more efficient and effective processing of dollars spent?  
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E. THESIS STATEMENT 
With this research, our goal is to analyze and identify trends across Q4 contractual 
spending in the Navy Operations and Maintenance accounts from FY2014–FY2016. This 
analysis may aid the government in determining the driving factors for these awards and 
ensure the government is gaining the best value for the limited resources available. 
Defined trends and identifiers enable the DOD to identify efficiencies while protecting 
critical assets and continuing to meet the military’s needs. 
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II. CURRENT PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES DRIVING 
GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
Chapter II provides an outline on the current budget and fiscal processes within 
the DON potentially deriving spending habits. The budget and programming process 
within the DOD is a heavily regulated and calendar driven process. Resource execution is 
difficult on its own with ensuring compliance with fiscal and contract laws, but the 
difficulty and criticality is often compounded by changing environments, priorities, and 
still being held to calendar-driven dates. The regulated policies and processes 
implemented against the services’ execution may be a significant driver leading to the 
year-end habits the services portray today. 
A. THE BUDGET AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS 
Congress and the President must enact appropriations which provide funding for 
Federal agencies to operate in a new fiscal year by October 1st, the first day of the fiscal 
year (Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974). Congress issues law 
each year to “Authorize” programs (in other words, allow a program to exist) and then 
“Appropriate” funds to programs (which provides funds) in the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA). Funds are therefore provided with specific purposes, in 
specific amounts, and for a specified period of time (Contract and Fiscal Law 
Department, 2015, p. 20). Figure 2 shows a depiction of the Congressional enactment 
timeline displaying one of the first calendar-driven processes driving service execution 




Figure 2.  Congressional Enactment Timetable. Source: DAU (2016).  
It is a well-known fact that Congress often does not meet the enactment 
prescribed timelines and a continuing resolution (CR) is passed as a temporary operating 
measure of business. As stated in an online publication by the Institute to Reduce 
Spending, “Budgeting in Congress is a process—and a history—of missing deadlines, 
busting caps, and growing instability” (Institute to Reduce Spending, 2014, para. 1). 
Regardless of the reason, Congress often addresses missed deadlines with a CR. Due to 
the political fall-out from a so-called “government shutdown” along with the negative 
impact to the full faith and trust in the U.S. credit, Congress is left with an easy resolution 
that pushes true budget decisions down the road. CRs have grown from short, stop-gap 
measures allowing just enough time for negotiation of a yearly budget, to long-term 
methods of funding the government for the entire year (Institute to Reduce Spending, 
2014, paras. 5–6). The practical results of CRs are numerous, yet the true magnitude of 
its use may yet be unknown. 
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B. CONTINUING RESOLUTION 
As defined by the United States Senate, CRs or Continuing Appropriations are 
“Legislation in the form of a joint resolution enacted by Congress, when the new fiscal 
year is about to begin or has begun, to provide budget authority for Federal agencies and 
programs to continue in operation until the regular appropriations acts are enacted” 
(United States Senate). In other words, when the budget has not been passed by 1 
October, Congress must find a short term way to provide funds, done via a CR, to avoid a 
government shutdown. Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) protects the services by 
allowing them to continue work at the same rate of operations approved during the 
previous fiscal year during a specified period of time. Often times, Congress is unable to 
meet extended deadlines and multiple CRs are enacted in a given fiscal year before a 
budget is passed. Except for fiscal years 1989, 1995, and 1997 (see Figure 3), in the last 
sixty years Congress has enacted a CR at least once each year (Institute to Reduce 
Spending, 2014, para. 3). The Institute to Reduce Spending provided a depiction of the 
duration and number of CR periods enacted since 1998. 
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Figure 3.  Duration of Continuing Resolutions from FY1998–2016. Source: 
Institute to Reduce Spending (2014). 
Ms. Judy Thomas, a budget methods specialist for the Budget Concepts Branch 
from Office of Management and Budget, provided a presentation in 2007 addressing the 
generalities of CRs. CRs are governed with a few guidelines for level of operations the 
services can execute during a prescribed CR period, they are as follows: 
Allocation and execution of funding under a CR is held to the lessor of; 
prior year, current-year or Congressionally marked funds. 
Sec. 101 (a) Such amounts as may be necessary, at a rate for operations as 
provided in the applicable appropriations Acts for fiscal year XXXX and 
under the authority and conditions provided in such Acts, for continuing 
projects or activities...that are not otherwise specifically provided for in 
this Act, that were conducted in fiscal year XXXX, and for which 
appropriations, funds, or other authority were made available in the 
following appropriations Acts. (Thomas, Spinner, & Tarberner, 2007, p. 4)  
No New Starts Section 104, General Provisions:  
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Except as otherwise provided in section 102, no appropriation or funds 
made available or authority granted pursuant to section 101 shall be used 
to initiate or resume any project or activity for which appropriations, 
funds, or other authority were not available during fiscal year XXXX. 
(Thomas et al., 2007, p. 11)  
CRs provide services coverage for continued operations in contract and civilian 
personnel in avoidance of Anti-deficiency Act violations. Per law, the government cannot 
receive work for free, and cannot agree to pay people in advance of receiving funding 
authority. CRs play a big role in the services’ ability to execute funding within the first 
quarter and often times through mid-year. Often, allocation is limited during CR periods 
and services are held to incrementally funding contract awards, and pushing out new 
awards to later in the fiscal year. This incremental funding process quickly embellishes 
the Contracting Officers’ work load and condenses work into the fourth quarter.  
The GAO released a report in March 2013 laying out some of the impacts of 
budget uncertainty and CRs on agency operations; Budget Issues; Effects of Budget 
Uncertainty from Continuing Resolutions on Agency Operations. Among the CR impacts 
the GAO reported potential contracting delays which negatively impacted ability to fully 
compete and award contracts (Sager, 2013, p 7). Another example of CR implications on 
service spending habits referenced in the report is that longer CRs distort agencies’ 
spending they must quickly obligate funds that are released later in the fiscal year (Sager, 
2013, p. 8). The report also outlined that CR’s can delay hiring and make it more difficult 
to fill a position by end of the year. Without sufficient time to allocate spending to high-
priority tasks (e.g., hiring) are instead spent on quicker to purchase, lower priority items 
(Sager, 2013, p. 8).  
Figure 4 displays results from a 2013 Harvard Study on year-end spending 
compared to the timing of appropriations. Clear trends show the later appropriations are 
enacted, the stronger year-end spending habits reside within the services (Liebman & 
Mahoney, 2013, p. 30).  
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Figure 4.  Year-End Spending by Appropriations Date. Source: 
Liebman & Mahoney (2010, p. 30). 
C. PLANNING PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION (PPBE) 
DOD uses a specific method to budget for, request, and monitor Congressionally 
appropriated funds: the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
system. Instituted under Mr. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, in 1962, the PPBE 
system is a five-year continuous process for planning and requesting appropriations from 
the component level up the chain through the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
inclusion in the President’s annual funds request to Congress (DAG, 2013, Ch. 1.2, p. 4). 
The system works in a phased cycle that projects five years into the future. PPBE begins 
with a planning process, which sets a strategic directive. Programming then establishes 
estimates to accomplish the mission from the component level and refers to program cost 
estimates compiled from the ground up (DAG, 2013, Ch. 1.2, p. 4).  
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At any given time, there are three cycles of resourcing at play: the current-year 
budget awaiting authorization and appropriation bills, the budget year with the 
President’s budget for the next fiscal year, and programing for the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP) for the next five years. Figure 5 shows a depiction of overlapping 
timelines provided from DAU showing at any given time all of the churn and impacts 
budgeting has on the services (DAU, 2016, p. 6). 
 
Figure 5.  Resource Allocation Process. Source: DAU (2016). 
 Components estimate how much is required to sustain and move programs 
forward for the next five years. The programs then compete with other programs from the 
component level up to the President’s request, and then through receipt of Congressional 
appropriation and authorization. Numerous adjustments to estimated program costs are 
made in order to obtain final Congressional authorization and appropriation.  
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Part of the competition revolves around performance of the program, but also how 
much of the funds previously appropriated for the effort were necessary and obligated 
(DAG, 2013, Ch. 1.2, p. 5). With regard to O&M funding, this is especially important, as 
yearly requirements for the operation and maintenance of facilities, equipment, and 
others are expected to be relatively consistent. The PPBE process is predicated upon prior 
year obligations (and in some cases, expenditures) and basing the next year’s budget on 
those numbers.  
In May 2003, the DOD added the execution phase, which tracks how much of 
those planned dollars is spent and when (Acquipedia, n.d, para. 7). The execution phase 
is meant to ensure that the budgets requested are executed according to their plans and 
schedules and that the DOD is receiving value for the appropriations allotted. In practice, 
this can mean program funds that are not expended properly are deemed unnecessary by 
senior leadership outside of the programs span of control, and the funding is 
proportionally reduced during the next year’s budgetary planning process. The O&M 
appropriation has an open obligation period of 12 months, however it remains active for 
disbursements for five years after obligation with the issuance of a project order.  
Experience has shown the Departments’ transition of execution oversight 
expanding to both disbursement goals as well as obligation goals. In 2012, the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller and Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) released 
guidance implementing benchmarks for service obligations and disbursement of DOD 
resources. Figure 6 is an example of the benchmarks by appropriation the services are 
held to for oversight and monitoring programmatic execution (Higbee, Tremaine, 
Seligman, & Arwood, 2013, p. 2). 
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Figure 6.  Expenditure Rate Goals. Source: Higbee et al. (2013). 
OSD benchmarks are traditionally utilized for monitoring service execution. 
Recent WSD guidance is that obligation rates that do not  meet the benchmarks should 
not be used as the determination factor in execution (Higbee et al., 2013, p. 3). However, 
these goals still play a large role in the services’ push for year-end execution, ensuring 
every dollar is spent in avoidance of future budget reductions. The OSD benchmark 
research itself is devoted to finding reasons why services are not meeting these goals, 
with little consideration as to whether or not the benchmarks themselves may not be 
accurately suited to the current regulatory or funding environment. 
The funding appropriated for specific purposes are coded broadly as different 
“colors of money,” and include, but are not limited to DOD O&M, Procurement, 
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Research and Development (R&D), and Military Construction (MilCON) (AcqNotes, 
n.d.). For example, funds used for the procurement of large investments, say a new 
aircraft, would be coded as “Procurement” dollars. These colors are further subdivided by 
DOD component (AcqNotes, n.d.). For example, money obligated to support an Air 
Force purchase of an F-22 aircraft would be coded numerically so that when the line of 
accounting (similar to the routing number on a check) is obligated on a contract, grant, or 
other funding vehicle, the budget office can track that obligation as “Procurement funds” 
specifically for the purchase of aircraft, and appropriated for the Air Force.  
1. Apportioning Appropriated Funds 
Apportionment of Funds is the process whereby components receive the funds 
Appropriated or reprogrammed. This process begins with funds distribution from the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Program/Budget (OUSD(C)/PB) to the 
applicable Agencies (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2000, Vol. 2A, Ch. 1, 
p. 1-3). With the exception of appropriations that are expressly exempted, this process is 
part of a government-wide administrative process meant to allot funds to agencies with 
various limitations, to include programmatic or quarterly ceilings. The system is aligned 
with Spending Plans created by components (Krott, 2011, pp. C128–C129). The purpose 
of the system is two-fold: to “(1) achieve the most effective and economical use of 
amounts made available; and (2) prevent agencies from obligating funds in a manner that 
would result in a deficiency or require a supplemental appropriation” (Krott, 2011, 
p. C128). 
2. Reprogramming Funds 
After appropriation of funds and before their obligation, if deemed necessary by 
the Secretary of Defense, the DOD is empowered to transfer or reprogram funds from 
one authorized program to another (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2015, 
Vol. 3, Ch. 6, p. 6-3). This authority is controlled by a myriad of restrictions, limitations, 
and reporting requirements, including a requirement for prior approval for actions not 
found under general transfer authority. General transfer authority is granted via each 
National Defense Authorization act and provides the DOD with the ability to move funds 
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to a higher priority item. The decision for transfer is based on unforeseen military 
requirements, and may not be used if the Congress has denied funds for the item (Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2015, Vol 3, Ch. 6, p. 6-2).  
Although transfers require Congressional authority, DOD officials can realign or 
reprogram funds within an appropriations account, beneath a specific dollar threshold, as 
part of the management of ongoing fiscal responsibilities (Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), 2015, Vol. 3, Ch. 6, p. 6-12,). Per the guidance released by the 
Comptroller in May of 2016, for fiscal year 2016, this could be done for reprogramming 
actions with a cumulative change of no more than $15 million without notifying 
Congress in advance (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2016, p. 1). This 
flexibility can make it difficult to start planning for PPBE in the next cycle, as officials 
have to decide whether or not to start with the previous year’s baseline appropriation, or 
determine if the unforeseen changes warrant a new baseline.  
Reprogramming efforts are important to service execution because of the timing 
implications that cascade out to the contracting commands to meet unplanned 
requirements. Reprogramming actions are not vetted and supported under a continuing 
resolution. With continuing resolution being a way of life since 1998, the services have 
structured reprograming actions to occur simultaneously with mid-year reviews. This 
process also reduces the amount of reprogramming actions being sent up to Capitol Hill 
by a service at any given time. Mid-year reviews are execution actions by the service 
comparing a programs’ execution against OSD goals. If a program is under-executed and 
that cannot be justified, they often become a bill-payer and a source for another programs 
upcoming need via reprogramming action. Each reprogramming action must have a bill-
payer (source) identified for each request of additional dollars. Reprogramming actions 
can potentially take between 60–120 days. This means mid-year reprogramming actions 
equate to year-end allocation of dollars and a rush for additional contract awards. 
Resulting contract awards are often rushed and may not yield the most effective 
outcomes.  
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D. ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT, BONA FIDE NEEDS, AND 
MISAPPROPRIATIONS ACT 
Execution within the DOD is heavily scrutinized around the management of 
appropriate use of funding in support of time, purpose and amount. These represent the 
cornerstones of financial management and heavily impact the utilization of year-end 
spending on the services. This is one of the defining questions in the quality and need of 
contracts the services engage in at year-end with the rush of spending. The 
mismanagement of funding as it relates to time, purpose, and amount, can result in 
violations to fiscal laws including the Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA), Bona Fide Need, and 
Misappropriation. This section briefly explains the parameters around each of these fiscal 
boundaries and critical drivers in government spending.  
The purpose of the appropriations process at present is to allow Congress to 
authorize specific uses for funds, and then appropriate funds to that amount, time, and 
purpose. The laws contain a variety of caveats, restrictions and exceptions; however, 
violators of any one can be subject to various administrative, civil, or criminal penalties. 
1. Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA)—Amount 
The ADA was enacted to ensure the government does not agree to purchase 
things for money they do not have (Anti-Deficiency Act, § 1341–42, 1511–19). In 
essence, Congress provides approval for the existence of programs and an amount of 
money to support them—all based on and negotiated within the President’s budget. This 
rule prohibits obligation, or authorization of an obligation, in excess of or in advance of 
appropriated or apportioned dollars (Contract and Fiscal Law Department, 2015, p. 22). 
The ADA prohibits federal employees from: 
Making or authorizing an expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an 
obligation under, any appropriation or fund in excess of the amount 
available in the appropriation or fund unless authorized by law. (31 U.S.C. 
1341(a)(1)(A)) 
Involving the government in any obligation to pay money before funds 
have been appropriated for that purpose, unless otherwise allowed by law. 
(31 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1)(B)) 
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Accepting voluntary services for the United States, or employing personal 
services not authorized by law, except in cases of emergency involving the 
safety of human life or the protection of property. (31 U.S.C. 1342) 
Making obligations or expenditures in excess of an apportionment or 
reapportionment, or in excess of the amount permitted by agency 
regulations. (31 U.S.C. 1517(a)) 
ADA violations are essentially an amount violation by definition, as the 
prohibitions are against spending more money than available at a specific point in time. 
Violations of this act carry administrative penalties, to include removal from position, 
suspension from duty without pay, or removal, and criminal penalties to include, fines, 
imprisonment or both (GAO, n.d.).  
2. Bona Fide Needs—Time 
The Bona Fide needs rule is coupled to both time and purpose. At its most basic, 
the bona fide needs rule states the government shall have an actual need, during the fiscal 
year for the appropriations used, for the item it agrees to purchase (Undersecretary of 
Defense (Comptroller), 2016, Vol. 3, Ch. 8, pp. 8-11–8-12). The need of an item must be 
established by an agency before funds are obligated; however that need may be before or 
later than when the agency needs to use the goods or the benefit of services. For each of 
these types, Congress and the Act itself provides certain exceptions, which may allow a 
purchase to be treated as if the bona fide need exists in the current fiscal year (Contract 
and Fiscal Law Department, 2015, p. 3-10). 
When the bona fide needs rule is violated, it often creates a violation of the ADA 
as well. For example, if current-year funds are shown to violate the bona fide needs rule, 
then an obligation for a good or service was also made in advance of the appropriation. 
This is the textbook definition of an ADA violation, leaving perpetrators subject to civil, 
criminal, and administrative penalties. 
3. Misappropriations Act—Purpose 
This act deals with the issue of the wrong color of money being used for a 
purchase (31 U.S.C. § 1301(a)). As previously discussed, O&M is supposed to fund 
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expenses such as salaries, travel, minor construction, operation, maintenance, and small 
stock or equipment purchases. These rules and any exceptions are provided at length in 
the FMR, one such rule being that a purchase for a “system” over $250k counts as an 
investment, not an expense and must therefore, use Procurement dollars (Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller), 2000, Vol. 2A, Ch. 1, p. 1-10). If an organization were to split 
the purchase of certain equipment into smaller dollar-value contracts and use O&M funds 
when the equipment is meant to function together as a system, those purchases would 
have been purchased with the wrong funds. Here again, this is a situation where a per se 
violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act has occurred. If Procurement funds for this system 
were not available at the time of the purchase, the purchase would have been made 
without sufficient appropriated funds.  
E. UNDERSTANDING THE O&M APPROPRIATION 
In the most general terms, Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding is utilized 
to fund sustainment activities of an organization. Examples of cost elements traditionally 
funded by the O&M appropriation are as follows: 
Overhead operations; traditionally headquarters operations where support 
does not physically touch the system 
Civilian salaries and awards 
Travel 
Fuel 
Minor Construction projects $1M or less 
Expenses of operational military forces,  
Training and education, recruiting,  
Depot maintenance,  
Purchases from Defense Working Capital Funds (e.g., spare parts),  
Base operations support,  
And assets with a system unit cost less than the current 
expense/investment threshold ($250K). (Acquipedia, n.d., pp. 3–6) 
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Operations and Maintenance accounts are further defined by service. The DON 
utilizes Operations and Maintenance, Navy funding (OM&N). The DOD Comptroller in 
the 2017 Operations and Maintenance Budget Exhibits states “The Operation and 
Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) appropriation finances the day-to-day costs of operating 
naval forces, including fuel, supplies, and maintenance of ships, Navy and Marine Corps 
aircraft, related weapon systems, and the support establishment ashore” (Under Secretary 
of Defense (Comptroller), 2016, p. 17). 
Figure 7 demonstrates O&M has the shortest period of availability of all 
department appropriations. The period of availability translates to O&M being the most 
monitored and scrutinized appropriation within the DOD (DAU, 2016, p. 9). This also 
leads to O&M being the most difficult funds to execute in an environment intended for 
flexibility and agility to the unknown. O&M funding is authorized for a period of 12 
months (1 October through 30 September). The appropriation is meant to fund yearly 
operations and maintenance of a program, system, or other authorized purpose. O&M 
may include services such as support personnel, repair or maintenance personnel, 
engineering or assembly. O&M may also, in limitation, include certain materials or 
supplies (Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2000, Vol. 2A, Ch. 1, p. 1-11).  
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Figure 7.  Appropriation Life Cycle. Source: DAU (2016, slide 9). 
One of the defining policies surrounding O&M funding is the understanding of 
expense versus investment. The determination for an expense versus investment 
considers the intrinsic quality of an item. These qualities include considerations like 
durability (investment cost), consumability (operating cost), and the specific 
circumstances of the item’s use or management in the acquisition. If definitions conflict, 
these fact specific considerations determine the case (Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller), 2000, Vol. 2A, Ch. 1, p. 1-10). DOD FMR, Volume 2A, Chapter 1 
provides the following guidance for making the expense versus investment 
determination: 
Expenses are the costs incurred to operate and maintain the organization, 
such as personal services, supplies, and utilities. 
Investments are the costs that result in the acquisition of, or an addition to, 
end items. These costs benefit future periods and generally are of a long-
term character such as real property and personal property. (Under 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 2000, Vol. 2A, Ch. 1 p. 1-10)  
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Historically, O&M funding could not be obligated to obtain services that cross to 
the next fiscal year without violating the bona fide needs rule; however, this made certain 
kinds of services difficult to support. The FY98 Defense Authorization Act changed the 
rules regarding severable services (DAP, n.d.). Presently, several exceptions exist for 
both supplies and services that cross the fiscal year.  
(1) Non-severable Services 
A non-severable service is a service with culminates in a single deliverable or 
completed effort (Murphy, R., 1996, p. 4). Non-severable services should be funded 
entirely with O&M funds from the fiscal year in which the need originates and awards 
(31 USC Section 1502 (a)). For example: a painting that culminates in a completely 
repainted building, should be funded completely in the fiscal year that painting was 
determined to be necessary. If work is set to begin on an effort in September of 2016 and 
will not be completed until January 2017, it is appropriately funded with current FY16 
funds. 
(2) Severable Services 
For the DOD, a specific exemption allows for severable services that extend 
beyond fiscal years to be funded with current-year dollars, via 10 U.S.C. § 2410a. Under 
the terms of this exemption, severable services which cross fiscal years for no more than 
a period of 12 months are granted exemption to the terms of the ADA. For example, a 
weekly grass cutting service might be considered severable and properly funded through 
30 September of one year, and use next year appropriations beginning in 1 October of 
each year. However, if the contract is awarded in April for a period ending in November 
of the same calendar year (the complete spring to fall season), the contract can be funded 
completely with current FY O&M appropriations. This is a particularly important 
exception because, due to the appropriations process discussed above, apportioned funds 
for the purchase of new fiscal year contracted goods and services are rarely available on 1 
October of a new fiscal year.  
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(3) Summary 
The operational use and availability of O&M funding is heavily scrutinized 
making it extremely difficult for the services in spending year end dollars. The various 
restrictions and short time-frame must be met with critical questions regarding the 
quality, necessity, and availability of the requirement when funds are spent so heavily at 
year end. Prior to making an end of year award with O&M, past experience and GAO 
cases have ensured that additional scrutiny must be given to truly determine whether or 
not the award is truly needed (bone fide need rule), if the performance will start before 
the next fiscal year (ADA rule), and if the appropriation supports the kind of use 
appropriate for these funds (purpose).  
F. FISCAL YEAR-END PROCESSES AND DRIVERS 
As mentioned throughout this research thus far, there are numerous drivers and 
policies contributing to the habits of year-end spending amongst the services. At present, 
a notion commonly accepted by industry is that fourth quarter (specifically September) is 
when the large majority of funds (of any color) are spent (Federal Times, 2015). In the 
context of O&M, certain potential drivers can be contemplated based on existing 
processes and include: 
• The apportionment process 
• The timing of appropriations and use of continuing resolutions 
• The perception of excess funding and impeding decrement in the next 
fiscal year 
• The extended length Procurement Acquisition Lead Times (PALT) 
• The O&M appropriations process itself 
• The 80/20 GAO rule and congressional mandate 
Over 30% of the Department of Navy spending is centralized in the fourth quarter 
every year, (Govini, Positioning for 2017). As with anything else in procurement, with an 
increase in speed, comes a decrease in quality and competition. The next chapter reviews 
specific data trends and analysis on the Departments spending between FY14–FY16.  
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A 2016 memorandum from the Secretary of the Army discusses some of these 
same points. For instance, this memo acknowledges that the Army focus on budget 
execution without due consideration of the outcomes leads to bad business practices to 
include the “use or lose” mindset and unwillingness to engage in practices that might be 
more efficient (Murphy, 2016, p. 2). The outcome of this memo is a set of directives to 
focus on measurement of outcomes, identification of the total cost of critical processes, 
and restrictions on use of budget execution information as a means to assessing the 
success of fiscal success and as a justification for automatic decrement to command 
programs in future allotments (Murphy, 2016, p. 2). These aims attempt to eliminate the 
“use or lose” mentality). The practical application and results of these measures is as of 
yet, not widely known, however the emphasis and discussion points coincide with many 
spending drivers considered in this research.  
G. O&M SPENDING TRENDS 
Although the accepted opinion is that fourth quarter spending is astronomical, 
historical spending trends for fourth quarter obligations show that they are in the 25%–
30% range. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) presented 
Congress with a report in March 2010 detailing DOD-wide fourth quarter obligation 
rates from 2006–2009 (Figure 8; GAO, 2010). This report concluded active and 
reserve components obligated between 27.6% and 29.5% of its O&M appropriations in 
the fourth quarters. For all colors of money during this period, the report concluded 
that the percentage of contract obligations competed was highest in the fourth quarter 
(GAO, 2010, pp. 35–38). 
Figure 8.   Q4 Obligation Rates for O&M-Active and Reserve Components. 
Source: GAO (2010). 
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In comparing the spend rates for 2006 to 2009, the obligation rates remained 
moderately consistent year-to-year. The report further dissects each year and outlines 
active components obligated 23.3% to 32.2% in the fourth quarter (between 23.3% and 
27.1% for Navy), while reserve components obligated 19.6% to 41% in the fourth quarter 
(Navy Reserve: 19.7% to 26.2%; Marine Corps Reserve: 19.6% and 41%). In each case, 
the DOD officials posited that the obligation rates may appear higher in the fourth quarter 
due to supplemental funding provided late in the FY (GAO, 2010, pp. 20–25). This same 
report examined obligations by contract action and found no consistent pattern.  
In August 2016, GAO released a report examining the yearly O&M spending 
trends from 2009–2015, as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  Enacted and GAO-Estimated Obligation Amounts for the DOD's 
Operation and Maintenance Base Accounts, FY2009–2015. 
Source: GAO (2016, p. 13). 
GAO reports are based upon initial budget requests submitted and approved 
through Congressional appropriation. During year of execution, budget portfolios often 
alter due to mid-year reprogramming actions, decrements, and supplemental overseas 
contingency funds provided. GAO reports facts from a particular point in time. Due to 
allocations and realignments, the base implemented could be different from the originally 
enacted base. 
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As shown in Figure 10, the actual dollar value of changes from the baseline were 
largely equal between transfers and reprogramming requiring Congressional approvals 
versus reprogramming between budget activities that did not require Congressional 
approval (GAO, 2016). The GAO report discovered that the primary functions obligated 
above the initial baseline were base operating support, administrative and management 
functions, and mobilization (GAO, 2016, p. 14). 
 
Figure 10.   Operation and Maintenance Enacted Funding from Military Services’ 
and Defense-Wide Agencies’ Accounts that the DOD Realigned Using 
its Authorities, FY2009–2015. Source: GAO (2016, p. 12).  
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Finally, Mr. Derek Trunkey of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) presented 
trends in O&M Spending for the DOD in June of 2016, analyzing O&M spending 
between 2000 and 2012. This presentation was followed-up with detailed analysis in a 
formal report on 5 January 2017. Figure 11 further discusses this growth trend 
(CBO, 2017). 
 
Figure 11.  Growth in Funding for Operation and Maintenance between 2000 and 
2012, after Removing Effects of Inflation. Source: CBO (2017, p. 20). 
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Total growth, after controlling for inflation, was $63.5 billion, equivalent to a 
47% increase (CBO, 2017, p. 20). This growth estimate did not contain additional 
Outside Continental United States (OCO) O&M dollars and reflects only the base budget. 
Figure 12 describes the breakout of this budget and describes what was and what was not 
well understood or tracked (CBO, 2017, p. 25). 
 
Figure 12.  Portions of Base-Budget Funding for Operation and Maintenance that 
Are Well Understood and Those that Are Not Easily Tracked. 
Source: CBO (2017, p. 20). 
The CBO reported the increase to the base O&M occurred despite falling 
personnel numbers and attributed increases largely to the Defense Health Program (DHP) 
and activities to support combat forces (CBO, 2017, p. 20). In the briefing, the CBO was 
able to explain many of these growth drivers, but had not been able to explain the growth 
in contracted facilities sustainment and non-depot equipment maintenance (Trunkey, 
2016, p. 21). The report clearly indicated that over half the O&M budget was not easily 
tracked, leading to difficulty ascertaining growth factors.  
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The CBO report also details a macro view of O&M spending from 1980 to 2015, 
and shows both an increase in overall spending and presents the often concealed OCO 
O&M dollars. Figure 13 displays that the actual amount of Navy O&M is slightly 
increased, but the majority of the year-over-year increases are associated with Defense 
Wide Organizations to include the Defense Health Program Office of Secretary of 
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc. (CBO, 2017, p. 10).  
 
Figure 13.  DOD's Total Funding for Operation and Maintenance, by Military 
Service, 1980–2015. Source: CBO (2017, p. 10). 
Based on the current publicly available analysis, it is clear that concerns remain 
with O&M spending trends. The net effect of these reports indicates that, as with the total 
budget, the O&M costs have increased in the last twenty years. It appears that despite 
being able to see overall trends, the current overall budget for O&M is difficult to 
ascertain due to the OCO and O&M reporting practices of the last decade. Our research 
takes these overall O&M trends as context and attempt to examine and answer when 
things are obligated in the fiscal cycle and identify likely reasons why the might be 
obligated at that time.  
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As evident thus far, this avenue of research, and the question of how to improve 
Q4 spending is not new. In 1992, the Department of Justice (DOJ) obtained special 
authority to roll over up to 4% of annual revenue into a fund that could be used for up to 
five years on information technologies (I.T.) and related projects. (Liebman & Mahoney, 
2013, p.5). Liebman and Mahoney estimated with the DOJ roll-over allowance, IT 
obligations in the fourth quarter reduced by 9.5 percentage points. This allows time for 
the department to appropriately contract and negotiate critical requirements rather than 
rush to spend funding on un-needed trivial supplies at year-end in a fear of losing funds. 
(Liebman & Mahoney, 2013, p. 29). Our research examines the current spending habits 
and attempt to assign rationales and drivers.  
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III. DATA AND TRENDS 
A. CAVEATS, CONTROLS, AND CONSIDERATIONS 
The data for this research was obtained through the DON and consists of 
information from the public Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). The data 
included all spending by Navy components for fiscal years 2014 (Department of the 
Navy, 2017a), 2015 (Department of the Navy, 2015) and 2016 (Department of the Navy, 
2017b) using the funding agency ID and name. The raw totals for each year are $88.02B, 
$88.6B, and $96.3B, respectively. 
We caveat that the data obtained are only as accurate as the data verified by 
individual FPDS report writers. As each query was run to obtain only actions performed 
within the fiscal year, it is the assumption of this team that such aberrations were 
manually added contract start dates. Finally, the full set of actions also included negative 
dollar contract actions. Negative dollar obligations represent such actions as removal of 
previous years’ money for contract closeout purposes, adjustment for removing work 
completely from a contract, or reallocating current-year funding due to line of accounting 
errors. Money may be obligated, removed, and replaced within the year for a variety of 
administrative reasons. Assessing whether a negative obligation removed current-year 
funds and replaced them on a subsequent action is not feasible with this data. In the 
overabundance of caution, the negative dollar values were left as part of the data.  
Despite these discrepancies, the overall data still effectively illustrates spending 
trends and habits of the monies obligated in the fiscal years. To control the data for only 
DON obligations for the fiscal year, each data set was scrutinized and adjusted for certain 
parameters. Actions showing a zero dollar obligations were removed as irrelevant to the 
data. The data provided by the DON additionally included a specific search function with 
the UIC/SBO claimant file based on the funding office ID to add the base supply office 
(BSO) name for each action. FPDS data represents actual contract execution. Amounts 
could vary when compared to the President’s budget funding levels for the Department 
due to year of execution reprogramming, decrements/ marks, and supplemental funding.  
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B. THE FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM  
As stated, all data trends referenced in this chapter are obtained from the FPDS 
contract database, publically available. Data from FPDS was analyzed from fiscal years 
2014–2016, operation and maintenance. FPDS is a publically available, web service, data 
system that houses and tracks all Federal contract actions. FPDS tracks various contract 
actions to include new contracts, modifications (both administrative and incremental), 
contract options and task order, and contract closeouts. FPDS houses numerous data 
elements available for each contract to include; dollar value, element of resource (EOR) 
or commitment item describing the product or service being procured, the service 
component and contract agency making the procurement, contract type, and the type of 
competition/bidding mechanism to describe the level of competition used. This chapter 
provides an assessment of contract data individually for fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 
2016. This assessment includes an evaluation of data across the fiscal years and derive 
meaningful discussion on trends, habits, and implications of year-end spending. Tables 1 
and 2 were created by the authors of this research and provide a list of data elements 
utilized in our analysis from the FPDS system and appropriations. 




Field Name FPDS Data Element? Manual Extrapolation from FPDS Data Field
Major Command Name X
Date Signed X
Quarter Signed Date Signed
Month Signed Date Signed
Portfolio X
OCC Description X
Referenced IDV PIIV X
Stand Alone Contract? If/Then formula utilizing the Referenced IDV PIIV data
Appropriation X
Dollars Obligated X
Contracting Officers Business Size Selection X FY14 & FY16 Only
Extent Competed X FY14 & FY16 Only
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Table 2.   Analyzed FPDS Appropriation Filters 
 
 
C. DATA AND TRENDS WITHIN NAVY SPENDING 
1. FY14 Data Trends within Navy Spending 
FY14 data (Department of the Navy, 2017a) is as of 30 September 2014 and has 
been filtered to reflect only the O&M appropriations with the Navy and Marine Corps. 
As of 23 February 2017, FPDS reported obligations for contract data within the Navy and 
Marine Corps of $19,851,623,556.41 (Department of the Navy FPDS Data, 2017a). The 
following figures were developed from the FPDS data sets provided by the DON depict 
different views of the contracted data sets to include time-phasing, output by command, 
vehicle delivery method via indefinite delivery contract (IDC) versus Stand Alone award, 
extent of competition initiated during award, and utilization of small business contracts. 
Figure 14 provides overall obligations and number of contract actions by quarter and 
Figure 15 provides obligations and number of contract actions by month in each quarter.  
Appropriations Analyzed
Operation & Maintenance, Navy
Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps
Operation & Maintenance, Navy Reserve
Operation & Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve
Operation & Maintenance, Recovery Act,  Navy
Operation & Maintenance, Recovery Act, Navy Reserves
Operation & Maintenance, Recovery Act, Marine Corp
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Figure 14.  FY14 Total Obligations by Quarter. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017a). 
 
Figure 15.  FY14 Navy/Marine Obligations over Time. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017a).  
  
 39 
Figure 16 depicts a trend of a steady increase with the highest obligation of 
dollars heavily condensed in the last month of FY14 Q2 and FY14 Q4. The number of 
actions steadily increased throughout the year, peaking in the last month in Q4. Fourth 
quarter obligations represent 43% of total contract obligations for the Navy and Marine 
Corps in FY14, and 40% of the total number of contract actions (Department of the 
Navy, 2017a). To further compound this, the month of September alone represents 26% 
of total obligations, and 20% of the total number of contract actions being executed in the 
fiscal year (Department of the Navy, 2017a).  
 
Figure 16.  FY14 Command Obligations by Quarter. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017a). 
Data were summarized by Major Command to facilitate analysis of who obligated 
dollars and at what points during the fiscal year. This analysis could help provide 
meaning in the type of contracts actions occurring during the fiscal year, and help 
identify some of the factors driving the service into late contract awards.  
The obligations trends for different commands represent a mix of increased and 
decreased spending over the fiscal year, although the trend remains with higher execution 
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centralized in the fourth quarter. Figure 17 provides the six commands with the highest 
rate of obligated dollars for FY14.  
 
Figure 17.  FY14 Obligations by Six Major Commands and Quarter. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2017a). 
Pairing down the data by the major six commands shows O&M awards are 
predominantly obligated by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP), the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), and the 
United States Marine Corps (USMC). Chapter IV further analyzes the mission for these 
commands to understand if there is a link between mission demands and contract awards, 
or if this is an example of unneeded requirements being caught in the year-end rush to 
execute before expiration. 
Data within Figure 18 examines the extent to how contracts are structured and 
awarded throughout the fiscal year. The intent is to examine if contract structure and 
methodology for awards change as we get closer to year-end spending. Figure 18 also 
examines the trends in number of actions and obligations for definitive contracts verses 
orders under IDC).  
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Figure 18.  FY14 Obligations and Number of Actions by IDC versus Stand-Alone 
Contract. Adapted from Department of the Navy (2017a). 
The number of IDC type contracts executed in the fourth quarter of the FY 
represents 29% of total obligations at $5.6 billion, and 25% of total number of contract 
awards (Department of the Navy, 2017a). Stand-alone contracts also increased in contract 
actions during the fourth quarter, but not to the extent of IDC contract actions. In addition 
to number of contract awards, the data show the value of contract obligations has 
significantly increased in IDC contracts in the fourth quarter. Chapter IV further 
investigates the potential rationale and implications of awards for indefinite contracts 
occurring late in the fiscal year. Figure 19 examines the extent competed by quarter, 
whether via simplified acquisition, fair opportunity on orders to IDCs, or full and open 
competition on definitive contracts.  
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Figure 19.  FY14 Extent Competed by Quarter. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017a). 
Full and open competition marks the highest competitive structure for contract 
awards throughout FY14, but jumps to over $4.8 billion in dollars obligated in the fourth 
quarter of the fiscal year (Department of the Navy, 2017a). Figure 20 examines contract 
obligations by performing business size.  
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Figure 20.  FY14 O&M Obligations by Business Size and QTR. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017a). 
Contract awards by company size do not appear to trend differently due to year-
end rush in O&M spending. Large business, labeled “Other than small business” awards, 
show a $2 billion increase in contract awards in the fourth quarter, but the trend of 
categorization remains relatively the same throughout the year where other than small 
business contracts significantly exceed small business award determinations.  
Finally, trends analyzing the overall obligations by product service code (PSC) 
portfolio name were examined. To fully analyze spending in hardware requires inclusion 
of hundreds of different North American Industry Codes (NAICS) and did not yield data 
suitable for trend examination. The intent of this data analysis is to identify trends in 
types of requirements services are procuring throughout the year, and if trends change 
during the fourth quarter. Figure 21 displays overall categories of contract awards in 
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FY14 and Figure 22 details the level of categories of contract awards executed only in the 
fourth quarter.  
 
Figure 21.  FY14 Portfolio by Obligations and Number of Actions. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017a). 
 
Figure 22.  4QFY14 Portfolios by Number of Actions. Adapted from Department 
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The type of requirements executed throughout the fiscal year do not appear to 
fluctuate at year end processing. Facility related services trend throughout the fiscal year 
as the top portfolio for contract execution, followed by equipment related services and 
knowledge-based services. The push for year-end spending does not appear to fluctuate 
in the type of requirements awarded at year end, with the O&M account according to this 
data for FY14. Obligations coded as #N/A are for a mixture of non-categorized actions 
that are purely hardware. This appears to be an inconsistency in coding in FPDS-NG, as 
several actions coded for hardware were also associated with the service portfolios. 
2. FY15 Data Trends within Navy Spending 
FY15 data (Department of the Navy, 2015) is as of 20 October 2015 and has been 
filtered to reflect only the O&M appropriations with the Navy and Marine Corps. As of 
20 October 2015, FPDS reported obligations for FY15 contract data within the Navy and 
Marine Corps of $18,047,399,967.88, executing over 110 thousand contract actions 
throughout the fiscal year (Department of the Navy, 2015). Similar to the FY14 data, 
Figures 23–29 depict different views of the contracted data sets to include time-phasing, 
output by command, and vehicle delivery method via IDC versus Stand Alone award. 
Data were not available for the FY15 data-set to analyze the extent of competition 
initiated during award, and utilization of small business contracts. Figure 23 provides 
overall obligations and number of contract actions by quarter and Figure 24 provides 
obligations and number of contract actions by month in each quarter.  
 
Figure 23.  FY15 Total Obligations by Quarter. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2015). 
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Figure 24.  FY15 Obligations Shown by Actions and Timelines. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2015). 
As in FY14, the data shows a steady increase in trending with the highest 
obligation of dollars heavily condensed at the fourth quarter. The number of contract 
actions appear to dip in the second month of each quarter and then sharply increase in the 
month of September. Fourth quarter obligations represent 35% of total contract 
obligations for the Navy and Marine Corps in FY15, and 35% of the total number of 
contract actions. To further compound this, the month of September alone represents 20% 
of total obligations, and 17% of the total number of contract actions being executed in the 
fiscal year. Figure 25 shows the data for FY15 as obligated by major commands, 
depicting trends in commands executing contract awards throughout the fiscal year.  
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Figure 25.  FY15 Command Obligations by Quarter. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2015). 
The obligations trends for different commands represent a mix of increased and 
decreased spending over the fiscal year, with higher execution centralized in the fourth 
quarter. The six commands depicting the highest rate of obligated dollars remains 
consistent from FY14 data sets as NAVFAC, NAVSEA, NAVSUP, NAVAIR, SPAWAR 
and USMC (Department of the Navy, 2015). Figure 26 summarizes obligations FY15 
data for these major commands.  
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Figure 26.  FY15 Obligations by Six Major Commands and Quarters. Adapted 
from Department of the Navy (2015). 
Fourth quarter data, as shown throughout this analysis, depicts an increase in 
overall contract awards and obligations, but does not appear to trend differently by 
executing command as compared to the remainder of the fiscal year. The six major 
commands shown, trend higher in execution throughout the fiscal year, not just the fourth 
quarter.  
Figure 27 examines the extent to how contracts are structured and awarded 
throughout the fiscal year. The intent is to examine if contract structure and methodology 
for awards change as we get closer to year-end spending.  
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Figure 27.  FY15 Obligations and Number of Actions by IDC versus Stand-Alone 
Contract. Adapted from Department of the Navy (2015). 
The number of orders against IDC type contracts executed in the fourth quarter of 
the fiscal year represents 23% of total obligations at $4.2 billion and 21% of total number 
of contract awards. Stand-alone contracts also display an increase in contract actions in 
the fourth quarter, but not to the extent of IDC contract actions. In addition to number of 
contract awards, the data show the value of contract obligations (sum of dollars 
obligated) has significantly increased in IDC contracts in the fourth quarter.  
Finally for FY15, trends analyzing the overall obligations by portfolio name were 
examined. Figure 28 displays overall categories of contract awards in FY15. Figure 29 
then details the level of categories of contract awards executed only in the fourth quarter. 





Figure 28.  FY15 O&M Spending by Type. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2015). 
 
Figure 29.  4QFY15 O&M Spending by Type. Adapted from 






Similar to FY14 data, the type of requirements executed throughout FY15 do not 
appear to fluctuate at year end processing. Equipment related services lead the execution, 
followed by facility related services and knowledge-based services. The push for year-
end spending does not appear to fluctuate in the type of requirements awarded at year end 
with the O&M account according to this data for FY15.  
3. FY16 Data Trends within Navy Spending 
FY16 data (Department of the Navy, 2017b) is as of 28 February 2017 and has 
been reduced to reflect only the O&M appropriations with the Navy and Marine Corps. 
As of 30 September 2016, FPDS reported obligations for contract data within the Navy 
and Marine Corps of $18,317,291,644.65; executing over 105 thousand contract actions 
throughout the fiscal year (Department of the Navy, 2017b). As shown in the FY14 and 
FY15 data, the following charts depict different views of the contracted data sets to 
include time-phasing, output by command, and vehicle delivery method via IDC versus 
Stand Alone award. Figure 30 provides overall obligations and number of contract 
actions by quarter and figure 31 provides obligations and number of contract actions by 
month in each quarter.  
 
Figure 30.  FY16 Total Obligations by Quarter. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017b). 
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Figure 31.  FY16 Navy/Marine Obligations and Actions Shown by Timeline. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2017b). 
As in FY14 and FY15, the data illustrates a steady increase in trending with the 
highest obligation of dollars heavily condensed at the fourth quarter. Q4 obligations 
represent 35% of total contract obligations for the Navy and Marine Corps in FY15 and 
34% of the total number of contract actions. To further compound this, the month of 
September alone represents 19% of total obligations, and 17% of the total number of 
contract actions being executed in the fiscal year. Figure 32 shows the data for FY16 as 
obligated by Major Command, depicting trends in commands executing contract awards 
throughout the fiscal year.  
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Figure 32.  FY16 Command Obligations by Quarter. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017b).  
The obligations trends for different commands represent a mix of increased and 
decreased spending over the fiscal year, with higher execution centralized in the fourth 
quarter. The six commands depicting the highest rate of obligated dollars are similar to 
FY14 and FY15 data sets, with NAVSEA, NAVAIR, NAVFAC, NAVSUP, SPAWAR, 
and USMC. Figure 33 shows FY16 data for these major commands.  
 
Figure 33.  FY16 Obligations by Six Major Commands and Quarter. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2017b). 
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Similar to FY14 and FY15, fourth quarter data depicts an increase in overall 
contract awards and obligations, but does not appear to trend differently by executing 
command as compared to the remainder of the fiscal year. The six major commands 
shown, trend higher in execution throughout the fiscal year, not just the fourth quarter.  
Figure 34 examines the extent to how contracts are structured and awarded 
throughout the fiscal year. The intent is to examine if contract structure and methodology 
for awards change as we get closer to year-end spending.  
 
Figure 34.  FY16 Obligations and Number of Actions by IDC versus Stand-Alone 
Contract. Adapted from Department of the Navy (2017b). 
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The number of IDC contracts executed in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year 
represents 21% of total obligations at $3.9 billion and 21% of total number of contract 
awards. Stand-alone contracts also display an increase in contract actions in the fourth 
quarter, but not to the magnitude of IDC contract actions. In addition to number of 
contract awards, these data depict the value of contract obligations (sum of dollars 
obligated) has significantly increased in IDC contracts in the fourth quarter.  
Finally for FY16, trends analyzing the overall obligations by portfolio name were 
examined. Figure 35 displays overall categories of contract awards in FY16 and Figure 
36 displays the level of categories of contract awards executed only in the fourth quarter. 
As with the 2015 data, Portfolio categories for equipment, which display as “#N/A,” were 
removed from this graphic.  
 
Figure 35.  FY16 O&M Spending by Type. Adapted from 






Figure 36.  4QFY16 O&M Spending by Type. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy (2017b). 
Similar to FY14 and FY15 findings, the type of requirements executed throughout 
FY16 do not appear to fluctuate at year end processing. Equipment related services lead 
the execution, followed by facility related services and knowledge-based services. The 
push for year-end spending does not appear to fluctuate in the type of requirements 





IV. PROJECT FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A. TIMING MATTERS 
So you may be asking yourself at this point, what does all of these data really 
mean? Throughout this chapter, we identify the trends and characteristics of the FY14–
FY16 data points and attempting to derive answers, or possibly additional questions, to 
that very question. Total O&M contractual spending for Navy and Marine Corps range 
from $88-$96 billion across fiscal years FY14–16. O&M dollars represent roughly 20–
23% of the overall contracts spending in the Navy and Marine Corps each fiscal year. 
Federal procurement (contract spending) is the category with the highest discretion, and 
impact, over timing of obligations and spending in any given fiscal year. This category is 
the heart of government spending and represents the procurement of all equipment, 
facilities, and support personnel. Although small (roughly 20%), this category packs the 
largest bang for the departments dollar in meeting the departments campaign plan. 
Without this funding, the Navy would have none of the funding critical for day to day 
operations, to include a variety of services need to maintain ships, different kinds of 
training, various kinds of engineering services, and no general support. This funding is 
the glue that fills in those constant needs of an operating force. 
Figure 37 and 38 provide a summary of FY14 through FY16 and show there are 
two central points in any given fiscal year of escalated contract activity, in both 
obligations and number of contract actions. As shown in Figure 39, March and 
September trend on the highest period of contract activity in any given fiscal year. Now 





Figure 37.  Comparison of Dollars Obligated by Quarter 2014–2016. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2015, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
Figure 38.  Trend Line of Number of Actions Performed 2014–2016. Adapted 
from Department of the Navy (2015, 2017a, 2017b). 
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Figure 39.  Time-Phased Comparison, Obligations, and Actions FY14–FY16. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2015, 2017a, 2017b). 
Both March and September represent key periods of execution in the DOD, 
especially as it relates to O&M funding. March represents the middle of the execution 
year, or otherwise known as mid-year reviews. Mid-year represents a key milestone for 
budget and execution as it is the point when both the service and OSD review 
programmatic execution for looming bill payers. This is the time where the services, and 
OSD, analyze programmatic spending habits as it relates to OSD benchmarks against 
obligations and expenditures. If a program is shown as under-executing during this time, 
they are reported as a possible “use” for unfunded or under-funded mid-year bills and 
could be decremented if the service cannot provide a valid justification for delay in 
execution. September, as is well known, represents the end of a fiscal year where O&M 
funding will expire and be returned to Treasury if not obligated. This point in time is 
critical for O&M funding due to the un-availability for dollars to roll-over into the next 
fiscal year. Any dollars not spent, are returned to Treasury and “marked” against the 
program as under-executing resulting in potential future reductions of funding levels. 




B. WHAT ARE DOLLARS SPENT ON AND BY WHOM? 
Based on our research the majority of O&M dollars are allocated to equipment-
related and facility services (with equipment coded #NA as a close second). These trends 
do not appear to vary in Q4 with the exception of FY14, where facility related services 
surpassed equipment related services. According to the Govini article discussed in 
Chapter II, the drivers of procuring units within O&M have shifted from ship-related 
equipment to aircraft support (Govini, 2016). In terms of O&M funds, as the ships and 
aircraft age, more funds are necessary for general upkeep.  
The data sets from FPDS on the six major commands makes sense. Across FY14–
FY16, the six major commands with the highest contractual trends in both dollars and 
number of awards were NAVSEA, NAVAIR, NAVFAC, NAVSUP, SPAWAR, and 
USMC. All of the commands directly support the procurement of ships, aircraft, 
facilities, and supporting supplies and services to support the Navy and Joint warfighter. 
These six commands remained consistent in Q4 spending represented by the overall 
Navy. Our research did not further investigate spending habits at the operational level 
because the major spend patterns were consistent in Q4, and the major buyers across the 
entire fiscal year were largely consistent. The trends for whom are spending and what 
they are spending it on, appear to be largely unaffected by Q4 spending.  
C. DECISION DRIVERS FOR SPENDING HABITS  
In Chapter I, we questioned what drives the Department to make these decisions 
as it relates to contractual spending in year-end awards with expiring dollars. Of 
particular interest were if we differ in types of contact awards as we move closer to the 
end of the fiscal year and how timing affected sole-source justifications for an expedited 
award versus competitive award. While we were unable to make attribution for many 
contract strategies based on the FPDS data, two clear trends emerged from the data: 
increased obligation in Q2 and Q4.  
The end of Q2 and Q4 both represent key points of execution in the DOD, 
especially as it relates to O&M funding. The end of Q2 represents mid-year reporting. 
This is the time where the services, and OSD, analyze programmatic spending habits as it 
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relates to OSD benchmarks against obligations and expenditures. While not a conclusive 
rationale, it is logical to tie this pattern with the ‘use or lose’ habits. During the Q2 
review, if a program is shown as under-executing during this time, they are reported as a 
possible “use” for mid-year unfunded and under-funded bills and could be decremented if 
the service cannot provide a valid justification for delay in execution. Q4 represents the 
end of a fiscal year where O&M funding expires and, with few exceptions, budget 
authority to use remaining funds dies. The link between these two major execution events 
is so strong, and indeed the increased spending by month in these two quarters is so 
significant that they appear to be clear drivers of the spending trend. Additional drivers in 
how money is obligated are examined below:  
1. Uncertainty 
FPDS data has shown that over a third of O&M funding is pushed to the fourth 
quarter before obligating every fiscal year. In particular, FY14 data shows 43% of its 
annual contract spending was pushed to the fourth quarter. While FY15 and FY16 data 
appear to project better results, fourth quarter spending still ended at 35% of contract 
spending occurring in the fourth quarter. The Q4 spending percentages in our research are 
higher than the 2006–2009 trends depicted in Chapter II of this research. However, due to 
the different research methodologies, a direct explanation is not readily discernable. This 
significantly positions the department’s most critical account, Federal O&M dollars, into 
high risk territory for decrements and future loss of funds.  
Studies suggest Departments purposely save funding early in the FY when future 
spending supply and demands are unknown and then burn through this supply funds at 
the end of the year. (Liebman & Mahoney, 2013, p. 1). Given the length of time required 
to start contract processes, it follows that the additional spending being allowed going 
into Q2 could not occur in the normal trend lines. A major theme that is tied to each of 
these potential drivers is uncertainty, and may shed light on the spending habits shown 
overall for the DON. 
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2. Competition 
Contrary to our initial assumptions, the strategy to use competition appears to 
have the greatest positive impact in Q4 obligations. Trends appear to demonstrate use of 
competition at a statistically significant increased percentage for Q4. This includes 
competition ranging from the full and open methods used in stand-alone contracting, 
competitions for simplified acquisitions, and fair opportunity under IDC contracts. 
3. IDC versus Stand-Alone Contracts  
Figure 40 and figure 41 summarize the obligations and count of actions for IDC 
versus stand-alone contracts. The number of contract actions issued against IDCs greatly 
exceeds contract actions issued against stand-alone definitive contracts for the entire year, 
and are particularly higher in Q4. Conceptually, this may be unexpected, particularly 
when considering that stand-alone contracts include purchase orders made under the 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT). However, this is perhaps logical in terms of 
obligation amount. Tasks or delivery orders issued against an indefinite base contracts are 
intended to be easier to perform, both in terms of documentation and timeline restrictions. 
This is because most of the negotiation of terms and conditions, and requirements for 
timelines and public notice, have been completed on the base contract.  
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Figure 40.  IDC versus Stand-Alone Actions FY14–FY16. Adapted from 
Department of the Navy  (2015, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
Figure 41.  Total Obligations via IDC versus Stand-Alone Actions FY14–FY16. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2015, 2017a, 2017b). 
 
IDC Stand Alone IDC Stand Alone IDC Stand Alone
FY14 FY15 FY16
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
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The total IDC obligations are 70% higher than stand-alone contracts in FY14, and 
53% higher than stand-alone contracts in both FY15 and FY16. The actual number of 
actions is similarly biased towards IDC actions. A potential motive for this discrepancy 
could be the shortened length of time needed to issue an order against an IDC. These time 
frames are shortened both by regulatory exemptions and pre-negotiated terms and 
conditions. For example, orders against indefinite contracts have an exemption from 
synopsis requirements (FAR 5.202-5(a)(6)), and often pricing for supplies are pre-
negotiated (GSA, n.d, p. 9). The effect it has on competition is equally as important. Full 
and open competition may yield any number of responses in a stand-alone contract 
environment, which must be fully evaluated. In the case of many IDCs, they are subject 
to competition with the base award and use Multiple Award Contract (MAC) schedules. 
This effectively signifies that solicitations against MACs result in a smaller number of 
more qualified proposals to evaluate and award. 
4. Spending per Action 
A particularly notable trend in spend patterns is the number of actions increase in 
Q4 without an equivalent increase in the actual obligation amounts. In short, the Q4 
timeframe includes a larger number of smaller dollar actions than those in earlier 
quarters.  
Figure 42 suggests the average dollar per action is largely stable across IDCs with 
average cost per action incrementally increasing each quarter. The absolute difference for 
all three years is between a low of $135k per action in Q1 FY16 to a high of $194k in Q4 
FY14. Stand-alone contract amounts show greater variation in average cost per action 
between quarters, following no discernable trend each year. The absolute difference for 
all three years is between a low of $136k in Q3 FY15 to a high of $238k in Q1 FY15. 
The trend shows stand-alone contracts in the first quarter having higher average 




Figure 42.  Average Dollar per Action via IDC versus Stand-Alone FY14–FY16. 
Adapted from Department of the Navy (2015, 2017a, 2017b). 
The number of actions increase incrementally in each quarter with a decrease in 
actions occurring in Q3 of each year before the largest spike in Q4. The percent-changed 
for average dollar per action does not align with the change in number of actions. IDCs 
are somewhat more consistent and by the end of the year, are back up to larger average 
dollars per action than in previous quarters. The differences in average cost per action for 
stand-alone contracts vary. Despite the overall number of stand-alone actions increasing 
in Q4 of each year, Q4 stand-alone contract average dollars per action are never as high 
as its Q1 and Q2 counterparts. This means in the beginning of the FY, we are seeing 
fewer, larger dollar value contracts get awarded while Q4 sees a large number of lower 
dollar value, stand-alone contracts. For IDCs, the Q4 has a high number of high dollar 
value orders being issued. 
Departments are issuing significantly more contract actions and expending the 
largest amount of funds in Q4. The trends can be linked to any number of reasons, but 
primary causes include an effort keep the funds and protect future funding levels. This 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
What drives the Department to make these decisions as they relate to contractual 
spending in the rush of year-end awards with expiring dollars? Cost, Schedule, and 
Performance; the three pillars of program management and the defining factors for a 
program’s success directly tie to what we call year-end rush in spending habits across the 
DOD. Programs are measured by budget execution. Until this approach changes, the rush 
of year-end spending cannot change. As we have discovered, the Department of the Navy 
and United States Marine Corps, spend over 1/3 of their contractual budget in the fourth 
quarter every year. This represents upwards of $6–$8 Billion unobligated dollars until the 
last second for obligation.  
What drives the Department to make these decisions as they relate to contractual 
spending in the rush of year-end awards with expiring dollars? This research has 
identified a number of driving factors to these spending habits to include: political 
actions, by extending continuing budget resolutions; thresholds on fourth quarter 
spending; departmental policies that drive standardized OSD benchmarks and mid-year 
execution reports, and ultimately, the fear of the unknown. Studies suggest departments 
purposely save funding early in the fiscal year due to uncertainty, and then use this 
reserve of funds in Q4 when final budgets and demands are known and can be allocated 
accordingly. (Liebman & Mahoney, 2013, p. 1).  
The Department’s discretionary spending level has been in a constant decline over 
the past few years. With sequestration and budget caps, it does not appear the financial 
environment will see any improvements in the near future. If anything, it appears the 
consistent uncertainty is providing a detrimental impact to even spending habits across 
the year. The Department’s uncertainty in changing environments, demands, and 
resources stresses a program’s spending limits and causes programs to go into a shelter 
mode until a budget resolution is passed each year. By the time a budget is passed, a 
program is traditionally left with six months of spending authority and appropriation. 
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Contract timelines often taken several months, which drives a large number of year-end 
contractual awards.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1) What are some ways the government can control spending habits and 
ensure more efficient and effective processing of dollars spent?  
Drivers of year-end spending are heavily political and hard to change, as is 
everything in bureaucracy. The first milestone to pass is getting a mutual understanding 
on the drivers of this habitual trend across the services and a willingness to change. 
Independent services have tried to tackle this problem, but service level change cannot 
impact the bigger concern with Congressional and political parties and the perception of 
use-it-or-lose-it.  
(2) What drives the Department to make these decisions as it relates to 
contractual spending in the rush of year-end awards with expiring dollars? 
When examining the drivers assessed within this research, key points appear to be 
the budget uncertainty, the late release of funds for late appropriations bills, future 
budgets based on past expenditures, and the fact that O&M funds have a short life and a 
hard expiration date. 
(3) What are the trends and characteristics of DON spending throughout a 
fiscal year and how does it compare to spending in the Q4?  
Throughout this research we have observed that spending drastically increases, 
both in dollars and number of actions in Q4. Additionally, we have observed that this 
increase in actions is not met with a lower average dollar per action than in other quarters 
and that more actions are procured via IDCs versus stand-alone contracts. However; we 
have seen that what these dollars are spent on is not significantly different from what is 
purchased throughout the year and that use of full and open competition appears to be at 
its highest in Q4. What this means for the Navy from a practical standpoint is up to policy 
analysis and key decision makers, but from our research, we question the end effects of 
this kind of year end spending, both from a manpower and staffing arrangement, and 
from the concept of workflow management.  
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The Army put out a directive in 2016 called Every Dollar Counts. The focus of 
this directive was to shift patterns in justifications and communication to focus on metrics 
and programmatic impacts rather than obligation goals. The focus on spending, i.e., 
obligation goals, is one dimensional, you’re either meeting goals=good, or not=bad. Due 
to the recent time frame, no data are available on results of this shift on Army resources. 
The Army’s intent is to shift focus and talk more progression; requesting PMs tell the 
world what they have done to support the warfighter instead of how much money they 
have spent. The Army’s goal is to help the Congressional committees understand the 
complexities and benefits of departmental spending in hopes the focus of benchmarked 
goals are not the sole metric for resource decrements. We recommend a similar drive in 
the Navy to change the culture of “use or lose,” but caveat that to be truly effective the 
actual budgeting methods must be visibly and clearly shown to be more mission and 
outcome based instead of expenditure based.  
O&M is the appropriation most susceptible to year-end spending. When you 
consider CR constraints, long lead time for contract and legal reviews, twelve months 
becomes near impossible for good quality awards outside of the fourth quarter. The use 
of orders against IDCs is a practical way most organizations seem to get around this, but 
the availability stipulation hinders the department’s innovation and ability to truly derive 
the most efficient and effective contract awards for its money. Often times, we must live 
with what we have due to timing constraints which may be a waste of diminishing tax 
payer’s dollars. One way around this is Congress allowing for a roll-over provision, 
protecting O&M funding but allowing additional time for efficient processing of critical 
contract awards. This is unlikely for the entire appropriation, but there is precedent for 
this happening for certain categories.  
The DOJ demonstrated the benefits of the roll-over provision theory. The 9.5% 
reduction in IT obligations in Q4 shows that, in practice, a special authority to roll over 
some expiring funds can cause a statistically significant reduction of spending rates 
(Liebman & Mahoney, 2013, p. 29). Use of a similar provision on Navy specific or other 
special related projects could allow time for the department to appropriately contract and 
negotiate critical requirements rather than rush to spend funding on un-needed, trivial 
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supplies at year-end in a fear of losing funds. We recommend exploration of similar pilot 
programs in the Navy. 
C. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The areas of this research can inform, but not directly attribute the causes for all 
spending habits. Clear trends are a starting point which can be used as various avenues of 
research to promote better results for government spending. Several key areas include 
more qualitative studies on the results of the use or lose mentality, and the planning and 
spending affects caused by uncertainty. For future research additional consideration may 
be given to how many negotiations or discussions are closed in Q4 based on the funds 
status and potential for programs to die or be delayed due to lack of funds. Getting the 
best outcome in a negotiation may not be possible with the existing regulatory structure 
and appropriations framework for obligations. In addition, future research on the number 
of different kinds of actions, to include assessment of purchase orders, award of large 
IDC base contracts without dollar values, and other unique contracting actions may yield 
additional information to describe how spending trends are affected by or affect 
procurement strategies. Finally, an examination of actual Q4 work processes, their 
outcomes, and how they differ from the previous three quarters may shed light on how 
effective our overall acquisition processes, our workforce planning, and work structure 
are. 
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